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Abstract
Focusing on tax policy with incomplete asset markets, we create a framework for proving the existence
of Pareto improving taxes, for computing them, and for bounding the improvement.
The protagonist is the price adjustment following an intervention. If the price adjustment is suﬃ-
ciently sensitive to risk aversions, then generically in economies equilibria admit Pareto improving tax
rates–if tax parameters and incompleteness exceed household heterogeneity, and multiple commodities
exist. We explain how to verify this sensitivity test with standard demand theory.
We then illustrate that diﬀerent policies generically admit Pareto improving taxes, by showing they
all pass this sensitivity test. These include (a) taxes on asset purchases, (b) lump-sum taxes on present
income plus one ﬂat tax on asset purchases, (c) asset measurable taxes on capital gains, (d) excise taxes
on current commodities.
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01I n t r o d u c t i o n
When asset markets are incomplete, there are almost always many Pareto improving policy interventions, if
there are multiple commodities and households. Remarkably, these policies do not involve adding any new
markets.
Focusing on tax policy, we create a framework for proving the existence of Pareto improving taxes, for
computing them, and for estimating the size of the improvement.
The protagonist is the price adjustment following an intervention. Its role is to improve on asset insurance
by redistributing endowment wealth across states, as anticipated by Stiglitz (1982). The price adjustment
is determined by how taxes and prices aﬀect aggregate, not individual, demand.
If taxes targeting current incomes are Pareto improving, then they must cause an equilibrium price
adjustment, Grossman (1975). Conversely, we prove that if the price adjustment is suﬃciently sensitive to
risk aversion, then for almost all risk aversions and endowments, Pareto improving taxes exist. We show how
to verify this sensitivity test with standard demand theory, which Turner (2003a) extends from complete to
incomplete markets.
To numerically identify the Pareto improving taxes, we give a formula for the welfare impact of taxes. It
requires information on the individual marginal utilities and net trades, and on the derivative of aggregate,
but not individual, demand with respect to taxes and prices.
T ob o u n dt h er a t eo fP a r e t oi m p r o v e m e n t ,w ed e ﬁne an equilibrium’s insurance deﬁcit. Pareto optimality
obtains exactly when the insurance deﬁcit is zero. If the tax policy targets only current incomes, then the
implied price adjustment determines the best rate, by integration against the covariance of insurance deﬁcit
and net trades across agents. The equilibrium’s insurance deﬁcit arises from the agents’ component of
marginal utility for contingent income standing orthogonally to the asset span.
Many diﬀerent tax policies generically support a Pareto improvement, because they all pass this one
sensitivity test. These policies include (a) taxes on asset purchases, as in Citanna, Polemarchakis, and
Tirelli (2001), (b) lump-sum taxes on current income plus one ﬂat tax on asset purchases, similar to Citanna,
Kajii, and Villanacci (1998) and to Mandler (2003), (c) asset measurable taxes on capital gains, and (d)
1excise taxes on current commodities, similar to Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (2002), who emphasize
consumption externality over asset incompleteness.
Some policies fail the sensitivity test and never improve everyone’s welfare. For example, reallocate
current incomes lump-sum and force households to keep original asset demands. If utilities are time separable,
they keep future commodity demands, inducing utilities for current consumption. The First Welfare Theorem
implies this tax policy is not Pareto improving. The example ﬂunks the sensitivity test because the future
price adjustment is zero, independently of risk aversion. For another example, for each asset tax purchases
and subsidize sales at the same rate. Then each asset’s price adjusts to oﬀset the tax, and the ﬁnal cost of
holding a portfolio of assets stays the same. Demand and welfare stay the same. The example ﬂunks the
sensitivity test because the price adjustment is the negative of the tax, independently of risk aversion.
To ultimately decide whether a tax policy generically supports a Pareto improvement, we give primitives
for the sensitivity of price adjustment. This requires information about the derivatives of aggregate demand
with respect to policy and prices. The price adjustment is sensitive to risk aversion if there is (1) Full
Reaction of Demand to Policy, and (2) Suﬃcient Independence of the Reactions of Demand (to Policy and
to Prices). That is, if (1) there is high enough rank in the derivative of aggregate demand with respect
to policy, and (2) it is possible to aﬀect the derivative of aggregate demand with respect to prices while
preserving the derivative with respect to policy, by perturbations to risk aversion. The ﬁrst example violates
(1); the rank is below the number of households by budget balance. The second example violates (2); the
derivatives are each other’s inverses, whatever the risk aversion.
The existence result for a tax policy, that it supports a Pareto improvement at any equilibrium, speaks
not of every economy but only of a generic economy. At some economies the endowments are Pareto optimal,
so that no price adjustment could lead to a Pareto improvement; at equilibria of other economies, everyone
has the same marginal propensity to demand, so that no price adjustment exists.
In turn, to decide whether a tax policy meets primitives (1), (2), we invoke an extension of Slutsky theory
from complete to incomplete markets.
Turner (2003a) develops the Slutsky theory of demand for commodities and assets in incomplete markets.
First, it decomposes the derivative of demand with respect to commodity prices, asset prices, and asset payoﬀs
2into an income eﬀect and a Slutsky substitution eﬀect. Next, it identiﬁes the properties that every Slutsky
matrix must satisfy, and conversely proves that any matrix satisfying these properties is the Slutsky matrix
of some demand. Finally, it shows that the Slutsky matrix can be perturbed arbitrarily, subject only to
maintaining these properties, by perturbing the second derivative (risk aversion) of the utility generating the
original Slutsky matrix, while preserving demand and the income eﬀect matrix. These results for incomplete
markets mirror exactly those for complete markets derived by Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1980).
For some economies, the price adjustment function does not admit any Pareto improving interventions,
even though the equilibrium allocation is not Pareto optimal. By taking Slutsky perturbations of demand,
we show that for almost all nearby economies the price adjustment function does admit them. Slutsky
perturbations are thus the key to why there exist almost always Pareto improving taxes.
Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986) began the study of generic improvements with incomplete mar-
kets, and introduced the idea of Slutsky perturbations from quadratic utility perturbations. Since they
allowed the central planner to decide the agents’ asset portfolios, they did not need to go beyond perturbing
the Slutsky matrices of commodity demand. To show why weaker interventions may improve welfare, such
as anonymous taxes and changes in asset payoﬀs, it became necessary to take into account how agents’
portfolio adjustments caused a further price adjustment. Naturally, this required perturbing asset demand
as well as commodity demand. The lack of a Slutsky theory for incomplete markets blocked contributions
f o ro v e rt e ny e a r s 1, until a breakthrough by Citanna, Kajii, and Villanacci (1998), who analyzed ﬁrst or-
der conditions instead of Slutsky matrices. Researchers have extended the theory of generic improvements
with incomplete markets to many policies by applying this ﬁrst order approach; Cass and Citanna (1998),
Citanna, Polemarchakis, and Tirelli (2001), Bisin et al. (2001), and Mandler (2003).
The Slutsky approach has certain advantages. First, to compute the Pareto improving interventions
from my formula the policymaker needs to know the derivative of aggregate, but not individual, demand.
In the ﬁrst order approach the policymaker needs to know the second derivative of every individual’s utility,
i.e., the derivative of every individual’s demand function. Second, to express the economic intuitions the
economist can keep to the familiar language of demand theory, as in (1), (2), instead of the abstract language
1The sole one is Elul (1995).
3of submersions. Third, every time the researcher thinks a new result via Slutsky perturbations, he saves
himself the work of implicitly reworking demand theory anew via quadratic utility perturbations.
Turner (2003b) adds to the result on the generic existence of Pareto improving ﬁnancial innovation, by
Elul (1995) and Cass and Citanna (1998). It argues that if the price adjustment to ﬁnancial innovation passes
the test of suﬃcient sensitivity to risk aversion, then generically Pareto improving ﬁnancial innovation exists.
Then Slutsky perturbations reveal that substitution free ﬁnancial innovation in an existing asset passes this
test indeed.
These results suggest that the reason any policy would generically admit Pareto improving parameter
values, be it ﬁscal, ﬁnancial or otherwise, is precisely the passing of the sensitivity test. They also suggest
that Slutsky perturbations are useful in discovering which other policies pass this test.
The paper continues as follows. Section 2 presents a general model of tax policy, and details several
examples of tax policy. Section 3 has the formula for the welfare impact of taxes. Section 4 obtains the
generic existence of Pareto improving taxes from the sensitivity condition on price adjustment, which it then
reinterprets in terms of the Reaction of Demand to Prices and to Policy. Section 5 summarizes the demand
theory in incomplete markets necessary to check the sensitivity in terms of the Reactions, then section 6
checks it for the several tax policies. Section 7 estimates the rate of Pareto improvement. Section 8 derives
the welfare impact formula, and spells out the notation and the parameterization of economies.
2G E I T m o d e l
Households h =1 ,...,H know the present state of nature, denoted 0, but are uncertain as to which among
s =1 ,...,S nature will reveal in period 1. They consume commodities c =1 ,...,C in the present and
future, and invest in assets j =1 ,...,J in the present only. Each state has commodity C as unit of
account, in terms of which all value is quoted. Markets assign to household h an income wh ∈ R
S+1
++ ,t o
commodity c<C ap r i c e p·c ∈ R
S+1
++ ,t oa s s e t j ap r i c e qj ∈ R and future yield aj ∈ RS.W ec a l l
(p·c)C
1 = p =( ps·) the spot prices, q =( qj) the asset prices, (aj)=a =( as) the asset structure, and
4w =( wh) the income distribution, P ≡ R
(C−1)(S+1)
++ × RJ.2 Taxes are t ∈ T,T some Euclidean space,
negative coordinates corresponding to subsidies. The set of budget variables is
b ≡ (P,a,w,t) ∈ B ≡ P × RJ×S × R
(S+1)H
++ × T
and has some distinguished nonempty relatively open subset B0 ⊂ B. B0 is B with T = {0}.
Demand for commodities and assets d =( x,y):B0 → R
C(S+1)
++ ×RJ is a function on B0. The demand
dh =( xh,yh) of household h depends on own income only, (xh,yh)(P,a,w,t)=( xh,yh)(P,a,w0,t) if
wh = w0h. Tax payment τ : B0
0×codom(d) → RS+1×dim(T) is a function such that τ(b0,d)t is the actual
tax payment, if demand and taxes are d,t. Tax policy (τh)h is anonymous if τh is independent of h,
and tax revenue τ is τ(b0,(dh)h) ≡ Στh(b0,d h).
An economy (a,e,t,t∗,d) consists of an asset structure a,e n d o w m e n t s e,t a x e s t, distribution rates
t∗, and demands d. For each household h, endowments specify a certain number eh
sc > 0 of each
commodity c in each state s,t h edistribution rates specify a fraction th
∗ > 0 with Σth
∗ =1 ,a n d
demands specify a demand dh. Let Ω be the set of (a,e,t,t∗,d).3




yh(b)=0 r − τ(b0,(dh(b))h)t =0
and b ≡ (P,a,(wh
s = eh0
s ps + th
∗rs)h
s,t) ∈ B0
We say (a,e,t,t∗,d) ∈ Ω has equilibrium (P,r) ∈ P × RS.AGEI is a GEIT with t =0 .
Under neoclassical assumptions (a,e,0,t ∗,d) ∈ Ω has an equilibrium4, and then the implicit function
theorem gives conditions for a neighborhood of (a,e,0,t ∗,d) to have an equilibrium.
2The numeraire convention is that unity is the price of sC,s ≥ 0,w h i c h P therefore omits. The addition to p of the
sC,s ≥ 0 coordinates, bearing value unity, is denoted p. We use the notation P =( p,q) ∈ P.
3The appendix spells out the parameterization of demand d.
4Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986).
52.1 Neoclassical demand
Consider the budget function β














Demand dh =( xh,yh) is neoclassical0 if T = {0} and there is a utility function u : R
C(S+1)




u throughout B0 Xh
0(b) ≡ {x ∈ R
C(S+1)
+ | β
h(b,x,y)=0 , some y ∈ RJ}
More generally, demand dh =( xh,yh) is neoclassical if there is a utility function u : R
C(S+1)
+ → R with
u(xh(b)) = max
Xh(b)
u throughout B0 Xh(b) ≡ {x ∈ R
C(S+1)
+ | β
h(b0,x,y)+τh(b0,x,y)tb =0 , some y ∈ RJ}5
If taxes tb =0 are zero, Xh(b)=Xh
0(b). Thus neoclassical demand restricts to neoclassical0 demand.
Neoclassical welfare is v : B0 → RH,v(b)=( vh(b)) ≡ (uh(xh(b))).
The interpretation of X is that the cost of consumption x in excess of income w is ﬁnanced by
some portfolio y ∈ RJ of assets, net of taxes. A portfolio speciﬁes how much of each asset to buy or sell
(yj ≷ 0), and aj
s how much value in state s an asset j buyer is to collect, a seller to deliver.
2.2 Four examples of tax policy
We detail T,B0,τh for four tax policies.6











B0 = {(P,a,w,t) ∈ B | q + tI ∈ aRS
++ for all subsets I, a has linearly independent rows}7
5The functions b → b0,→ tb are (p,q,a,w,t) → (p,q,a,w,0),→ t. Here y is deﬁned by x,i f a is full rank.
6For a vector v of reals, v+ is deﬁned by (v+)m =m a x ( 0 ,v m).
7For a subset I ⊂ {1,...,J} of assets, tI is deﬁned by (tI)j being tj or 0 according as j ∈ I or not.










B0 = {(P,a,w,t) ∈ B | q + f1I ∈ aRS
++ for all subsets I,a has linearly independent rows}




Measurability has every state’s tax rate ts = a0




B0 = {(P,a,w,t) ∈ B | q ∈ aRS
++,a has linearly independent rows, ts > −1}












B0 = {(P,a,w,t) ∈ B | q ∈ aRS
++,a has linearly independent rows, p0c + tc > 0}
Debreu’s smooth preferences imply neoclassical demand exists, and is smooth in a neighborhood of b if
yj,p0
sxs − ws,x 0c − e0c 6=0 for all j,s,c.W et e r mactive a GEI if it satisﬁes these inequalities for every
household, in the context of these four examples, or if all demands are locally smooth, in a general context.
3W e l f a r e i m p a c t o f t a x e s
We think of a smooth path t = t(ξ) of taxes through t =0 ,a n do finﬁnitesimal taxes as its initial velocity
˙ t = ˙ t(0). Suppose the active GEI (P,r;a,e,0,t ∗,d) is regular in that such a path lifts locally to a unique





s,t(ξ)). Thus taxes impact welfare only via the budget
variables they imply. By the fundamental theorem of calculus the welfare impact is the integral of Dbvh · ˙ b,
8Occasionally we view g,t as in RS+1 with g0,t 0 =0 . For a point g ∈ R(S+1)k,[g] ∈ R(S+1)k×S+1 denotes the matrix
whose sth column is gs· ∈ Rk in the sth block and zero in all the other k-blocks. If k =1 , as here, this is a diagonal
matrix with g along the diagonal. See ”aggregate notation” in the appendix.
9Occasionally we view t as in RC with tC =0 .
7which by abuse we call the welfare impact. We compute this product in the appendix, using the envelope
theorem for Dbvh and the chain rule for ˙ b, where the details of the notation appear.
Proposition 1 (Envelope) The welfare impact ˙ v ∈ RH of inﬁnitesimal taxes ˙ t at a regular GEI is
˙ v =( λ)0 ˙ m ˙ m =( th




Here (λ)0 collects the households’ marginal utilities of income across states, and ˙ m the impact on their
incomes, private and public. The private one is the impact ˙ r on revenue distributed at rate t∗ ∈ RH net
of the impact τh˙ t on tax payments, and the public one is the impact on the value of their excess demands
z in all nonnumeraire markets, that implied by the impact ˙ P on prices.
Policy targeting welfare must account for the equilibrium price adjustment it causes. The equilibrium
price adjustment undoes the excess aggregate demand that policy causes, and depends on the reactions of
aggregate demand to both policy and prices.
Proposition 2 (Revenue Impact) At a regular GEI ˙ r = τ ˙ t.
This follows from r = τt, the chain rule, and t =0 at a GEI. At a regular GEI there is a price
adjustment matrix dP, smooth in a neighborhood of it, such that ˙ P = dP ˙ t. Thus the welfare impact is
dv =( λ)0 ¡
(th
∗τ − τh)h − zdP
¢
A policy targeting current incomes is (ﬁrst order) Pareto improving only if taxes cause a price adjustment.
For if τh
s≥1˙ t =0 ,dP˙ t =0 then Σ 1
λh
0




h0 ˙ mh = Σ ˙ mh
0 = Σ(th
∗τ0 − τh
0)=0 so ˙ v À 0 is impossible.
Next we prove a converse.
4 Framework for generic existence of Pareto improving taxes
We prove the generic existence of Pareto improving taxes, stressing the role of changing commodity prices over
the role of the particular tax policy. Existence follows directly from a hypothesis on price adjustment. Thus
8the tax policy is relevant only insofar as it meets the hypothesis on price adjustment. Then we reinterpret
this hypothesis on dP in terms of primitives, the Reaction of Demand to Prices and the Reaction of Demand
to Policy.
Pareto improving taxes exist if there exists a solution to dv˙ t À 0. In turn this exists if dv ∈ RH×dimT
has rank H, which in turn implies that tax parameters outnumber household types dimT ≥ H.T h ek e y
idea is that if dv =( λ)0(th
∗τ − τh)h − (λ)0zdP is rank deﬁcient, then a perturbation of the economy would
restore full rank by preserving the ﬁrst summand but aﬀecting the second one. Namely, if some economy’s
dP is not appropriate, then almost every nearby economy’s dP is.
We have in mind a perturbation of the households’ risk aversion (D2uh)h,w h i c ha ﬀects nothing but
dP in the welfare impact dv. Now, to restore the rank the risk aversion must map into (λ)0zdP richly
enough. Since this map keeps (λ)0z ﬁxed, we require that (λ)0z have rank H and that dP be suﬃciently
sensitive to risk aversion. Cass and Citanna (1998) gift us the ﬁrst requirement:
Fact 1 (Full Externality of Price Adjustment on Welfare) Suppose asset incompleteness exceeds house-






Fact 2 At a regular GEI, dP is locally a smooth function of risk aversion; the marginal utilities λ
i,t a x
payments τi, and excess demands zi are locally constant in risk aversion.
For k ∈ R(S+1)(C−1)+J we say that a commodity coordinate is one of the ﬁrst (S +1 ) ( C − 1).
Deﬁnition 1 At a regular GEI, dP is k-Sensitive to risk aversion if for every α ∈ Rdim(T) there is
ap a t ho fr i s ka v e r s i o nt h a ts o l v e s k0d ˙ P = α0.10 It is Sensitive to risk aversion if it is k-Sensitive to risk
aversion for all k with a nonzero commodity coordinate.
Figure 1
Assumption 1 (Generic Sensitivity of dP) If H>1, then generically in endowments and utilities, at
every GEI dP is Sensitive to risk aversion.
10The appendix spells out a path of risk aversion. Here the dot denotes diﬀerentiation with respect to the path’s parameter.
9Figures 2, 3
This assumption banishes the particulars of the tax policy, leaving only its imprint on dP. Of course,
dP is deﬁned only at regular GEI, so implicitly assumed is that regular GEI are generic in endowments.
Theorem 1 (Logic of Pareto Improvement) Fix the tax policy and the desired welfare impact ˙ v ∈ RH.
Grant the Generic Sensitivity of dP under dim(T),S− J ≥ H>1,C >1. Then generically in utilities
and endowments, at every GEI ˙ v is the welfare impact of some ˙ t ∈ T. Hence a nearby Pareto superior
GEIT exists.





nonnumeraire excess demand equations
γ0(λ)0 ¡
(th
∗τ − τh)h − zdP
¢
=0
r − τt =0
γ0γ − 1=0
Suppose this is transverse to zero and the natural projection is proper. By the transversality theorem, for
generic endowments and utilities, this system of (dimp+dimq)+dim(T)+dimr+1equations is transverse
to zero in the remaining endogenous variables, which number dimp +d i mq +d i mr + H.B y h y p o t h e s i s
dim(T) ≥ H, so for these endowments and utilities the preimage theorem implies that no endogenous
variables solve this system—every GEI has dv with rank H.
This is transverse to zero. As is well known, we can control the ﬁrst equations by perturbing one
household’s endowment. For a moment, say that we can control the second equations and preserve the top
ones. We then perturb the third equations and preserve the top two, by perturbing r as well as numeraire
endowments—to preserve incomes wh
s = eh0
s ps + th
∗rs. We control the fourth equation and preserve the top
three, by scalar multiples of γ. So transversality obtains if our momentary supposition on γ0dv holds:












10since λ,τi,z are locally constant. We want to make α arbitrary, and we can if dP is k-sensitive, which
holds by assumption if k has a nonzero commodity coordinate. It has: Full Externality of Price Adjustment
on Welfare, C>1,γ 6=0 imply γ0(λ)0z is nonzero in the coordinate m = s1 for some s ≤ H − 1.
That the natural projection is proper we omit. (The numeraire asset structure is ﬁxed.)
We have seen that tax policy targeting current incomes, such as taxes on asset purchases, on net purchases
of current commodities, or lump-sum taxes on current incomes, supports a Pareto improvement only if there is
a price adjustment. Conversely, tax policy generically supports a Pareto improvement if the price adjustment
is suﬃciently sensitive to risk aversion. Therefore price adjustment is pivotal.
4.1 Expression for Price Adjustment
Before we can check whether a particular policy meets the Sensitivity of dP to Risk Aversion, we need
an expression for dP. We express dP in terms of the Reaction of Demand to Prices and the Reaction of
Demand to Policy, notions which are well deﬁned at an active GEI.
Let an underbar connote the omission of the numeraire in each state, deﬁne
d : B0 → R
(C−1)(S+1)
++ × RJ d = Σd
h
and the aggregate demand of (a,e,t,t∗) ∈ Ω
da,e,t,t∗(p,q,r) ≡ d(p,q,a,(wh
s = eh0
s ps + th
∗r)h
s,t)
with domain Pa,e,t,t∗ ≡ {(p,q,r) ∈ P × RS+1 | (p,q,a,(wh
s = eh0




∇≡Dp,qda,e,t,t∗ the Reaction of Demand to Prices
∆ ≡ Drda,e,t,t∗ · τ + Dtda,e,t,t∗ the Reaction of Demand to Policy12
(1)
Suppose a path of GEIT (P(ξ),r(ξ),a,(eh0
s ps(ξ)+th
∗rs(ξ))h











11Pa,e,t,t∗ is open, as the preimage by a continuous function of the open B0. Recall the notation P0 =( p0,q0).
12Clearly Drda,e,t,t∗ = ΣDwhdhth
∗.
11is an identity in the path’s parameter ξ.D i ﬀerentiating with respect to it,
∇ ˙ P + Drda,e,t,t∗ · ˙ r + Dtda,e,t,t∗ · ˙ t =0
Substituting for ˙ r = τ ˙ t from the Revenue Impact proposition,
∇ ˙ P + ∆˙ t =0
An active GEI is regular if ∇ is invertible. By the implicit function theorem, a regular GEI lifts a local
policy through t =0 to a path of GEIT through itself, such as the one just above.
Proposition 3 (Price Adjustment) At a regular GEI the Price Adjustment to inﬁnitesimal taxes is
dP = −∇
−1∆ (dP)
where the Reactions ∇,∆ are deﬁned in (1).
4.2 Primitives for the Sensitivity of Price Adjustment to Risk Aversion
Given the Logic of Pareto improvement, we want to check whether a policy meets the Generic Sensitivity of
dP. We provide primitives for the Sensitivity of dP,t h a n k st oe x p r e s s i o n( dP)13:
d ˙ P = −∇
−1 ˙ ∆ + ∇
−1 ˙ ∇∇
−1∆
Recall equation k0d ˙ P = α0 from deﬁnition 1. If ˙ ∆ =0 and ˜ k0 ≡def k0∇
−1 then the equation reads
˜ k0 ˙ ∇∇
−1∆ = α0. If ∆ has rank dim(T) then there is a solution β to β
0∇
−1∆ = α0 so it suﬃces to solve
˜ k0 ˙ ∇ = β
0. Thus dP is k-Sensitive if (1) ∆ has rank dim(T),( 2 ) ˜ k is nonzero everywhere, (3) whenever ˜ K
is nonzero everywhere and β ∈ R(S+1)(C−1)+J, there is a path of risk aversion that solves ˙ ∆ =0 , ˜ K0 ˙ ∇ = β
0.
(Take ˜ k = ˜ K.) Thus Generic Sensitivity of dP follows from the following (independently of the ˜ k deﬁned):
Lemma 1 (Activity) If H>1, generically in endowments every GEI is active and regular.14
13Applying the chain rule to JJ−1 = I gives d
dξJ−1 = −J−1( d
dξJ)J−1.
14We do not argue this relatively simple statement. For these endowments, both ∆ and dP are deﬁned.
12Assumption 2 (Full Reaction of Demand to Policy) If C>1, generically in utilities and endow-
ments, at every GEI ∆ has rank dim(T).
Lemma 2 (Mean Externality of Price Adjustment on Welfare is Regular) Generically in utilities,
at every regular GEI, whenever k is nonzero in some commodity coordinate, ˜ k0 ≡ k0∇
−1 is nonzero every-
where.
Assumption 3 (Suﬃcient Independence of Reactions) If H>1, then generically in endowments
and utilities, whenever ˜ k ∈ R(S+1)(C−1)+J is nonzero everywhere and β ∈ R(S+1)(C−1)+J,a te v e r yG E I
there is a path of risk aversion that solves ˙ ∆ =0 ,˜ k0 ˙ ∇ = β
0.
These primitives for the Generic Sensitivity of dP and the Logic of Pareto Improvement yield
Theorem 2 (Test for Pareto Improvement) Fix the tax policy and the desired welfare impact ˙ v ∈ RH.
Say the policy passes the Full Reaction of Demand to Policy and the Suﬃcient Independence of Reactions
under dim(T),S−J ≥ H>1,C>1. Then generically in utilities and endowments, at every GEI ˙ v is the
welfare impact of some ˙ t ∈ T. Hence there is a nearby Pareto superior GEIT.
Next we illustrate how to check whether a tax policy passes this test via demand theory in incomplete
markets, as developed by Turner (2003a). We show that the four tax policies in the introduction pass this
test, and therefore generically admit Pareto improving taxes, owing to the unifying logic of a sensitive price
adjustment. At a GEI ∇ will turn out to be independent of the policy, so we will verify the lemma on the
Mean for one and all policies.
5 Summary of demand theory in incomplete markets
We must check whether each policy meets the Full Reaction of Demand to Policy and the Suﬃcient Indepen-
dence of Reactions. For this we report the theory of demand in incomplete markets as developed by Turner
(2003a). The basic idea is to use decompositions of ∆,∇ in terms of Slutsky matrices, and then to per-
turb these Slutsky matrices by perturbing risk aversion, while preserving neoclassical demand at the budget
variables under consideration. We stress that this theory is applied to, but independent of, equilibrium.
135.1 Slutsky perturbations
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In showing the diﬀerentiability of demand, the key step is the invertibility of H(D2u). Slutsky matrices










where S,c are symmetric of dimensions C∗ +J,S +1 and m =( mx,m y) is C∗ +J ×S +1. A Slutsky
perturbation is ∇ = H(D)−1 − H(D2u)−1, for some symmetric D ≈ D2u that is close enough for
the inverse to exist. A Slutsky perturbation is a perturbation of Slutsky matrices rationalizable by some





˙ S − ˙ m




and view a Slutsky perturbation as a triple ˙ S, ˙ m, ˙ c. We identify Slutsky perturbations, without reference to
the inversion deﬁning them, in terms of independent linear constraints on ∇ :
on ˙ S ρ0 ˙ S =0 and ˙ S is symmetric
on ˙ m ρ0 ˙ m =0 and ˙ mxW0 =0
on ˙ c ˙ cW0 =0 and ˙ c is symmetric
(constraints)
Theorem 3 (Identiﬁcation of Slutsky perturbations, Turner 2003a) Given u smooth in Debreu’s
sense and b in B0 with t =0 , consider the Slutsky matrices H(D2u)−1. Every small enough Slutsky
14perturbation ∇ satisﬁes (constraints). Conversely, every small enough perturbation ∇ that satisﬁes
(constraints) is Slutsky: H(D2u)−1 +∇ is the inverse of H(D) for some D that is negative deﬁnite and
symmetric.
We use only Slutsky perturbations with ˙ m, ˙ c =0 by choosing ˙ S as follows. A matrix ˙ S ∈
R(C−1)(S+1)+J×(C−1)(S+1)+J is extendable in a unique way to a matrix ˙ S ∈ RC∗+J×C∗+J satisfying
ρ0 ˙ S =0 ;w ec a l l ˙ S the extension of ˙ S. It is easy to verify that if ˙ S is symmetric, so is its extension. In
sum, any symmetric ˙ S deﬁnes a unique Slutsky perturbation with ˙ m, ˙ c =0 .
5.2 Decomposition of demand
The relevance of Slutsky perturbations is that they allow us to perturb demand functions directly, while
preserving their neoclassical nature, without having to think about utility. This is because Slutsky matrices




+ − mh · ([xh]0 : yh
0) (dec)
Here Lh
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mh = Dwhdh, and ([xh]0 : yh


























s ps)s as [eh]0p,w eh a v e Dp,q[eh]0p =( [ eh]0 :0 ) ,s of r o m( 1 )w eh a v e
∇ = ΣDp,qd
h + Dwhd
h · ([eh]0 :0 )





h · ([xh − eh]0 : yh
0)





h · zh0 (∇)
This decomposition of the aggregate demand of (a,e,t,t∗) ∈ Ω generalizes Balasko 3.5.1 (1988) to
incomplete markets.
One implication of the decomposition is that ∇ is independent of the policy. So let us now provide
Proof that Mean Externality of Price Adjustment on Welfare is Regular. Consider the
manifold of regular GEI and a k that is nonzero in some commodity coordinate. Fix a coordinate n ≤
(S +1 ) ( C − 1) + J and apply transversality to
nonnumeraire excess demand equations
(k0∇
−1)n =0
This is transverse to zero. The burden of the argument is to control the bottom equation independently of
the top ones. Consider a Slutsky perturbation with ˙ m1, ˙ c1 =0 and ˙ S
1







−1)n = −(˜ k0 ˙ ∇∇
−1)n
Since ∇
−1 is invertible, there is α such that α0∇
−1 is the nth basis vector, so it suﬃces to solve
˜ k0 ˙ ∇ = α0. From decomposition (∇) ˙ ∇ = ˙ S
1
L1
+, so we want to solve ˜ k0 ˙ S
1
L1





for symmetric ˙ S
1




˜ kp so that (˜ k0 ˙ S
1
)o = βo. To




˜ kp in coordinate o 6= p and arbitrary x in coordinate p, so
that (˜ k0 ˙ S
1
)·p = Σo6=p˜ ko
βo
˜ kp + ˜ kpx. We can set this to βp and solve for x since ˜ kp 6=0 .
By the transversality theorem, for generic utilities in Debreu’s setting, the system of dimp +d i mq +1
equations is transverse in the remaining dimp+dimq variables. By the preimage theorem, for these generic
utilities every regular GEI with nonzero k has ˜ kn 6=0 . Taking the intersection over the ﬁnitely many
coordinates n, for generic utilities every regular GEI with nonzero k has ˜ k nonzero everywhere.
166 Four policies generically admitting Pareto improving taxes
We check for each policy the Full Reaction of Demand to Policy and the Suﬃcient Independence of Reactions.
In computing
∆ = Dtda,e,t,t∗ +( ΣDwhd
hth
∗) · τ
we use the following notation for S
















We can perturb Ph arbitrarily and get a Slutsky perturbation.
Remark 1 In checking the Suﬃcient Independence of Reactions, the ˙ S
h
Slutsky perturbations aﬀect only
the Jacobian ˙ ∇ = Σ ˙ ShLh
+ in (∇). Also, we solve ˜ k0 ˙ ∇ = β
0 piecemeal, solving ˜ k0 ˙ ∇p = β
0








q), ˙ ∇ =[˙ ∇p : ˙ ∇q].
6.1 Tax rates on asset purchases
Corollary 1 (Citanna-Polemarchakis-Tirelli 2001) Fix the desired welfare impact ˙ v ∈ RH. Assume
J,S − J ≥ H>1,C > 1. Then generically in utilities and endowments, at every GEI ˙ v is the welfare
impact of some ˙ t ∈ T. Hence there is a nearby Pareto superior GEIT with tax rates on asset purchases.
Proof. The next lemmas, dim(T)=J, and the hypothesis J ≥ H enable theorem 2.
The introduction of tax rates on asset purchases amounts to a household speciﬁc change in asset prices.
The price of asset j changes for household h exactly when yh
j > 0.S oDtda,e,t,t∗ = ΣDqd
hIh where
Ih ∈ RJ×J is a diagonal matrix with entry jj equal to one or zero according as yh
j > 0 or not. Specializing
































∗ · τ (∆q)
17Lemma 3 (Full Reaction of Demand to Policy) If C>1, generically in utilities and endowments, at
every GEI ∆q has rank dim(T).
Proof. Fix generic endowments from the Activity lemma and apply transversality to




where the hat omits the last J rows of ∆q. This is transverse to zero. The burden of the argument is to
control the middle equations independently of the top and bottom ones. We perturb only the Ph,s ot h a t
d
dξ ˆ ∆q = Σ ˙ PhIh.S a y φj 6=0 ;w em a k ec o l u m n j of d
dξ ˆ ∆q arbitrary and preserve the others. The GEI is
active and asset markets clear, so ﬁx h with yh
j > 0;t h e jth column of PhIh = jth column of Ph.S o
let ˙ Ph be (ak
φj )k in column j and zero in the others, and ˙ Pi6=h =0 .T h e n (Σ ˙ PhIh)φ = a is arbitrary.
By the transversality theorem, generically in endowments and utilities the system of dimp +d i mq +
(S +1 ) ( C − 1) + 1 equations is transverse in the remaining dimp +d i mq + J variables. By the preimage
theorem, for these every GEI is active and has ˆ ∆q (a fortiori ∆q) with linearly independent columns.
Lemma 4 (Suﬃcient Independence of Reactions) If H>1, then generically in endowments and
utilities, whenever ˜ k ∈ R(S+1)(C−1)+J is nonzero in some commodity coordinate and β ∈ R(S+1)(C−1)+J,
at every GEI there is a path of risk aversion that solves ˙ ∆ =0 ,˜ k0 ˙ ∇ = β
0.
Proof. Fix generic endowments from the Activity lemma, a GEI with ˜ km 6=0 for some commodity
coordinate m, and follow remark 1. For each asset j ﬁx h(j) with y
h(j)
j < 0,l e t ˙ Ph(j) be 1m
β(S+1)(C−1)+j
˜ km
in column j and zero in the others, and all ˙ Bh =0 . This keeps ˙ ∆ =0 and equates ˜ k0 ˙ ∇ to β(S+1)(C−1)+j
in coordinate (S +1 ) ( C − 1) + j. Having dealt with all asset coordinates j ≤ J via the ˙ Ph,w et u r nt o
the commodity coordinates n ≤ (S +1 ) ( C − 1). Let γ0 = Σ ˙ Ph0Lh.F r o md i s p l a y( S
h)i ts u ﬃces to choose
symmetric ˙ A1 such that ˜ k0
p ˙ A1L1 + ˜ k0
qγ0 = β
0
p or ˜ k0
p ˙ A1 =( β
0
p − ˜ k0
qγ0)(L1)−1 ≡ α0. Let column n 6= m of
˙ A1 be 1m
αn
˜ km so that ˜ k0
p ˙ A1 equals αn in coordinate n. To preserve symmetry, column m of ˙ A1 must
be αn
˜ km in row n 6= m and arbitrary x in row m.T h e n ˜ k0
p ˙ A1 equals Σn6=m˜ kn
αn
˜ km + ˜ kmx in coordinate
18m,w h i c hw ec a ne q u a t et o αm by solving for x. Having dealt with all coordinates n, this symmetric ˙ A1
solves ˜ k0 ˙ ∇ = β
0.S i n c e A1 does not appear in ∆, still ˙ ∆ =0 .
6.2 Lump-sum taxes on current income plus ﬂat tax rate on asset purchases
Corollary 2 Fix the desired welfare impact ˙ v ∈ RH.A s s u m e S − J ≥ H>1,C > 1,J > 0.T h e n
generically in utilities and endowments, at every GEI ˙ v is the welfare impact of some ˙ t ∈ T.H e n c e
there is a nearby Pareto superior GEIT with lump-sum taxes on current income plus ﬂat tax rate on asset
purchases.
Proof. The next lemmas and dim(T)=H +1 enable theorem 2.
The part of Dtda,e,t,t∗ relating to the lump-sum taxes l ∈ RH on current income is −ΣDwh
0d
h1h0,a n d











∗) · τ =( ΣDwh
0d
hth














For convenience, we reexpress the lump-sum part ΣDwh
0d
h(th
∗1 − 1h)0˙ lh = Σh6=HOh(th
















Lemma 5 (Full Reaction of Demand to Policy) If (S +1 ) ( C − 1) ≥ H>1, generically in utilities
and endowments, at every GEI ∆w has rank dim(T).
Proof. Fix generic endowments from the Activity lemma and apply transversality to




19where the hat omits the last J rows. This is transverse to zero. The burden of the argument is to control
the middle equations independently of the top and bottom ones. Write φ =( l,f) so that li 6=0 for some
i 6= H or f 6=0 .
If f 6=0 ,t h e nw ew a n t d
dξ ˆ ∆q1=a arbitrary but d
dξ ˆ Oh =0 ,w h e r e ˆ Oh ≡ Dwh
0xh − DwH
0 xH, and we
can by choosing some h with yh
1 > 0 and setting ˙ Ph to be a
f with a ∈ R(C−1)(S+1) in column 1 and
zero in the others, so that d
dξ ˆ ∆q1= ˙ PhIh1=a
f and d
dξ(ˆ ∆wφ)=(d
dξ ˆ ∆q1)f = a.
If li 6=0 , then we want the ith column of Σh6=H ˆ Oh(th
















∗) − (1 − ti
∗)ˆ Oi¤
= a








=0 . From the identiﬁcation of Slutsky perturbations, we set
d
dξDwh
0xh =0 for all h 6= i,a n d Dwi
0xi = a
1−ti
∗ by setting d
dξDwixi = aλi0
λi
0 —a Slutsky perturbation since
λ
i0W0 =0 from the FOC—so that ∗ = −(1 − ti
∗) d
dξDwi
0xi = −a. Any eﬀect on ♦ we can undo, since as
just seen we can make d
dξ ˆ ∆q1 arbitrary while preserving the Dwh
0xh.
By the transversality theorem, generically in endowments and utilities the system of dimp +d i mq +
(S +1)(C −1)+1 equations is transverse in the remaining dimp+dimq +H variables. By the preimage
theorem, for these every GEI is active and has ˆ ∆w (a fortiori ∆w) with linearly columns.
Lemma 6 (Suﬃcient Independence of Reactions) If H>1, then generically in endowments and
utilities, whenever ˜ k ∈ R(S+1)(C−1)+J is nonzero in some commodity coordinate and β ∈ R(S+1)(C−1)+J,
at every GEI there is a path of risk aversion that solves ˙ ∆ =0 ,˜ k0 ˙ ∇ = β
0.
Proof. The proof of the lemma for ∆q applies verbatim.
6.3 Asset measurable tax rates on future capital gains
Corollary 3 Fix the desired welfare impact ˙ v ∈ RH. Assume J,S − J ≥ H>1,C>1.T h e ng e n e r i c a l l y
in utilities and endowments, at every GEI ˙ v is the welfare impact of some ˙ t ∈ Tp. Hence there is a nearby
Pareto superior GEIT with asset measurable tax rates on future capital gains.
Proof. The next lemmas, dim(T)=J, and the hypothesis J ≥ H enable theorem 2.




s)+. State contingent taxes are asset measurable if they are a linear
function of asset payoﬀs, t = a0L for some L. The introduction of tax rates on capital gains amounts to a
household speciﬁc proportional change in commodity prices. The prices of state s commodities change in
t h es a m ep r o p o r t i o ne x a c t l yw h e n p0
sxh
s −wh
s > 0, i.e. ph
1 =[ p1](I +[th]).16 So Dtda,e,t,t∗ = ΣDp1d
h[p1]Ih
where Ih ∈ RS×S is a diagonal matrix with entry ss equal to one or zero according as p0
sxh
s −wh
s > 0 or

















































Note that at an active GEI for every s there are h,i with p0
sxh
s − wh
s > 0 > p0
sxi
s − wi
s.F o rw i t h t =0




syh for all h,s o Σp0
sxh
s − wh
s =0 by asset market clearing.
Lemma 7 (Full Reaction of Demand to Policy) If C>1, generically in utilities and endowments, at
every GEI ∆p has rank dim(T).
Proof. Fix generic endowments from the Activity lemma and apply transversality to




where the hat selects the (s1)s≥1 rows in the bracketed matrix {},o m i t t i n gt h e (sc)s≤S,c6=1 and asset rows.
This is transverse to zero. The burden of the argument is to control the middle equations independently of
the top and bottom ones. We perturb only the (Ah
1)s1 ∈ RS(C−1), so that ( d
dξ {ˆ ·})s = Σ( ˙ Ah
1)s1[p1]Ih.S a y
16For φs = p0
sxs − wh
s + gst − a0










∗rs with r =0 ,s ot h a t φs =( 1+ts)p0
s(xs − eh
s) − a0
sy, as if now
prices ps(t)=( 1+ts)ps. In sum, for every s ≥ 1 φs(t)=ps(t)0(xs − eh
s) − a0






s > 0 or not.
21φs 6=0 ; the GEI is active so ﬁx h = h(s) with gh
s > 0;f o ri t ,t h e sth column of [p1]Ih = sth column of
[p1]. Now let ( ˙ Ah
1)s1 be (...0: as
φsps110
c=1 :0 ...),s ot h a t ( ˙ Ah
1)s1[p1]Ihφ = as,a n d( ˙ Ah
1)t1 =0 for t 6= s, so
that ˙ Ah
1[p1]Ihφ =1 sas. Note that ˙ Ah is symmetric. Finding such h(s) for each s, Σs ˙ Ah
1[p1]Ihφ = a is
arbitrary. Thus let ˙ Ai =0 for those i distinct from every h(s) to get d
dξ {ˆ ·}φ = a.
By the transversality theorem, generically in endowments and utilities the system of dimp+dimq+S+1
e q u a t i o n si st r a n s v e r s ei nt h er e m a i n i n g dimp +d i mq + S variables. By the preimage theorem, for these
every GEI is active and has {ˆ ·} (a fortiori {} and {}a0) with linearly independent columns.
Lemma 8 (Suﬃcient Independence of Reactions) If H>1, then generically in endowments and
utilities, whenever ˜ k ∈ R(S+1)(C−1)+J is nonzero everywhere and β ∈ R(S+1)(C−1)+J, at every GEI there
is a path of risk aversion that solves ˙ ∆ =0 ,˜ k0 ˙ ∇ = β
0.
Proof. Consider generic endowments from the Activity lemma, and follow remark 1.
To solve ˜ k0
p ˙ ∇ = β
0
p we set the ˙ Ah =0 so that we seek ˜ k0
qΣ ˙ Ph0Lh = β
0
p or (ΣLh ˙ Ph)˜ kq = βp. For each
s there is i = i(s) with capital loss 0 > p0
sxi
s − wi
s, so we can ﬁx ˙ Pi(s) in coordinates (sc,j)c,j and still




a n dz e r oi nc o o r d i n a t e s (s0c,J)c for s0 6= s,
and zero in columns j<J .T h e nLi(s) ˙ Pi(s)˜ kq equals βsc in coordinates (sc)c and zero in (s0c)s06=s,c,
so (ΣsLi(s) ˙ Pi(s))˜ kq = βp. We let ˙ Ph =0 for those h distinct from any i(s), so (ΣLh ˙ Ph)˜ kq = βp. Recall
˙ ∆ =0 so far.
To solve ˜ k0
q ˙ ∇ = β
0
q,h a v i n gﬁxed the ˙ Ph, we want to solve ˜ k0
qΣ ˙ Bh = β
0
q − ˜ k0
pΣ ˙ Ph ≡ γ0 ∈ RJ with the
˙ Bh being symmetric. Since the latter do not ﬁgure in ∆, such as solution will complete ˜ k0 ˙ ∇ = β
0 with
˙ ∆ =0 . Set ˙ B1 to be diagonal with jth diagonal element
γj
˜ kj and the other ˙ Bh6=1 =0 .
6.4 Excise taxes on current commodities
Corollary 4 Fix the desired welfare impact ˙ v ∈ RH. Assume C − 1,S− J ≥ H>1. Then generically in
utilities and endowments, at every GEI ˙ v is the welfare impact of some ˙ t ∈ T. Hence there is a nearby
Pareto superior GEIT with tax rates on net purchases of current commodities.
Proof. The next lemmas, dim(T)=C − 1,a n dt h eh y p o t h e s i s C − 1 ≥ H enable theorem 2.
22The introduction of tax rates on net purchases of commodities, given endowments, amounts to a household
speciﬁc change in commodity prices. The price of commodity 0c changes to p0c + tc > 0 exactly when
xh
0c − eh
0c > 0,c < C. So Dtda,e,t,t∗ = ΣDp0d
hIh where Ih ∈ RC−1×C−1 is a diagonal matrix with
coordinate cc one or zero according as xh
0c − eh











































∗ · τ (∆p)
Lemma 9 (Full Reaction of Demand to Policy) If C>1, generically in utilities and endowments, at
every GEI ∆c has rank dim(T).
Proof. Fix generic endowments from the Activity lemma and apply transversality to




where the hat selects the (Sc)c<C rows in (∆p). This is transverse to zero. The burden of the argument is
to control the middle equations independently of the top and bottom ones. We perturb only the ( ˙ Ah
0)Sc,· ∈
RC−1, so that ( d
dξ ˆ ∆p)c = Σλ
h
0( ˙ Ah
0)Sc,·Ih. Say φc 6=0 ; since the GEI is active ﬁx h = h(c) with xh
0c−eh
0c > 0;









0)Sc,·Ihφ = αc. To preserve the symmetry of ˙ Ah, we set
( ˙ Ah
S)·,0c to be αc1c
λh
0
but this does not appear in ˆ ∆p. Setting ( ˙ Ah




0)Ihφ =1 cαc. D o i n gs of o re a c h c<C ,Σcλ
h(c)
0 ( ˙ A
h(c)
0 )Ih(c)φ = α is arbitrary. Now set ˙ Ai =0 for
those i distinct from all the h(c).T h e n d
dξ ˆ ∆pφ = α is arbitrary with all ˙ Ak symmetric.
By the transversality theorem, generically in endowments and utilities the system of dimp +d i mq +
(C − 1) + 1 equations is transverse in the remaining dimp +d i mq +( C − 1) variables. By the preimage
theorem, for these every GEI is active and has ˆ ∆p (a fortiori ∆p) with linearly independent columns.
23Lemma 10 (Suﬃcient Independence of Reactions) If H>1, then generically in endowments and
utilities, whenever ˜ k ∈ R(S+1)(C−1)+J is nonzero everywhere and β ∈ R(S+1)(C−1)+J, at every GEI there
is a path of risk aversion that solves ˙ ∆ =0 ,˜ k0 ˙ ∇ = β
0.
Proof. Fix generic endowments from the Activity lemma, a GEI with ˜ km 6=0 for every coordinate m,
and follow remark 1. Fix a commodity coordinate m = sc. Pick h(m) with x
h(m)
m − eh
m < 0,l e t ˙ Ph(m)
be 1m
β(S+1)(C−1)+j
˜ km in column j,s ot h a t ˜ k0 ˙ ∇ equals β(S+1)(C−1)+j in coordinate (S +1 ) ( C − 1) + j,
for all j ≤ J.T h i s ˙ Ph(m) keeps ˙ ∆p =0 because h(m) is a net seller in commodity market m. Having
dealt with all asset coordinates via the ˙ Ph, we turn to the commodity coordinates n ≤ (S +1)(C −1). Let
γ0 = Σ ˙ Ph0Lh.F r o md i s p l a y( S
h)i ts u ﬃces to choose symmetric ˙ Ah such that ˜ k0





pΣ ˙ AhLh =( β
0
p − ˜ k0
qγ0) ≡ α0. For column n = s0c0 pick h(n) with x
h(n)
n −eh





in coordinate nn,a n d ˙ Ai6=h(n) be zero in column n,s ot h a t (˜ k0
pΣ ˙ AhLh)n = αn
and still ˙ ∆p =0 because h(n) is a net seller in commodity market n. Doing so simultaneously for all n,
we get ˜ k0
pΣ ˙ AhLh = α0. This keeps the symmetry of the ˙ Ah and ˙ ∆p =0 .
7 The insurance deﬁcit bound on the rate of improvement
We bound the rate of Pareto improvement by the equilibrium’s insurance deﬁcit, which vanishes exactly
at Pareto optimality. The bound turns out to be the covariance of the insurance deﬁcit with the marginal
purchasing power.
Recall that the welfare impact is ˙ vh = λ
h0dmh where dmh is marginal purchasing power, for some
matrices Σdmh =0 . (dmh =( th
∗τ − τh) − zhdP.) Converting marginal welfare from utils to the numeraire
at time 0, marginal utility becomes λh
λh
0
,w h i c hw er e w r i t ea s λ
h with λ
h





h0dmh the mean welfare impact




h + c ∈ a⊥ ⊕ a
24by the ﬁrst order condition, being unique only in its insurance deﬁcit δ
h.I ft h emean insurance deﬁcit
is δ = H−1Σδ
h, then the GEI’s insurance deﬁcit is
∆ =[ δ
1 − δ : ... : δ
H − δ]S×H
Note that the GEI is Pareto optimal exactly when ∆ =0 17. Computing the mean welfare impact,





















= H · cov(∆,dm 1)
since Σdmh =0 .T h erate of Pareto improvement is the norm of the functional dW |dv≥0 .
Remark 2 At a regular GEI, the mean welfare impact equals the covariance across households of the insur-
ance deﬁcit and the marginal purchasing power, dW = cov(∆,dm 1). So the rate of Pareto improvement is
bounded above by the norm of this covariance.
If the tax policy targets only current income, i.e. τh




T h es o l ec o n t r o li st h ef u t u r ep r i c ea d j u s t m e n t ,s i n c et h eG E Is e t st h ei n s u r a n c ed e ﬁcit and net trade. In
a nutshell, the mean welfare impact of the sole control is minus the covariance of insurance deﬁcit and net
trade.
17Also, a household’s commodity demand is as though asset markets were complete exactly when δh =0 .
258A p p e n d i x
8.1 Derivation of formula for welfare impact
It is standard how Debreu’s smooth preferences, linear constraints, and the implicit function theorem imply
the smoothness of neoclassical0 demand. In fact, the implicit function theorem implies smoothness of neo-
classical demand in a neighborhood ˜ b ≈ b ∈ B, if neoclassical0 demand is active at b ∈ B0. It is standard
also that the envelope property follows from the value function’s local smoothness, which is the case for vh
as the composition of smooth functions:
Dbvh = DbL(x,y,λ
h) |(xh,yh)(b)
where b =( p,q,a,wh,t) and
L(x,y,λ



















[xh]0 + Dpτht : yh















0 : ∗ : −I : τh¢
So much for demand theory. Recalling regular GEI from the subsection on the Expression for the Price
Adjustment, dP 0 =( dp0,dq0) exists and
wh =[ p]0eh + th
∗r ⇒
dwh =[ eh]0dp + th
∗dr
=( [ eh]0 :0 ) dP + th
∗τ
using dr = τ from the Revenue Impact proposition.
26Thus the welfare impact at a regular GEI is




0):∗ : −I : τh¢
·
¡












where zh0 ≡ ([xh − eh]0 : yh




∗τ − τh) − zhdP
¢
8.2 Aggregate notation
We collect marginal utilities of contingent income, and denote stacking by an upperbar
(λ)0 ≡
⎡






















dv =( λ)0 ¡
(th
∗τ − τh)h − zdP
¢
To visualize the bracket notation [·] deﬁned in footnote 7, it staggers state contingent vectors:
[p] ≡
⎡












Af u n c t i o n F : M ×Π → N deﬁnes another one Fπ : M → N by Fπ(m)=F(m,π). Given a point 0 ∈ N
consider the ”equilibrium set” E = F−1(0) and the natural projection E → Π,(m,π) 7→ π. A function is
proper if it pulls back sequentially compact sets to sequentially compact sets.
27Remark 3 (Transversality) Suppose F is a smooth function between ﬁnite dimensional smooth mani-
folds. If 0 is a regular value of F,t h e ni ti sar e g u l a rv a l u eo f Fπ for almost every π ∈ Π. The set of
such π is open if in addition the natural projection is proper.
As u b s e to f Π is generic if its complement is closed and has measure zero. Write C∗ = C(S +1). Here
the set of parameters is
Π = O × O0 × (0,²)
where O,O0 are an open neighborhoods of zero in RC∗H,R
C∗(C∗+1)
2 H relating to endowments and symmetric
perturbations of the Hessian of utilities. We have in mind a ﬁxed assignment of utilities, which we perturb
by O0 × (0,²).S p e c i ﬁcally, given an equilibrium commodity demand x by some household and ¤ ∈
R
C∗(C∗+1)




(x − x)0¤(x − x)
where ωα : R → R is a smooth bump function, ωα |(− α
2 , α
2 )≡ 1 and ωα |R\(−α,α)≡ 0.I nan e i g h b o r h o o d




(x − x)0¤(x − x)
Du¤,α(x)=Du(x)+( x − x)0¤ ⇒ Du¤,α(x)=Du(x)
D2u¤,α(x)=D2u(x)+¤
So in an α-neighborhood the Hessian changes, by ¤, but the gradient, demand do not. For small enough
α,¤ this utility remains in Debreu’s setting, so neoclassical demand is deﬁned and smooth when active.
In the Suﬃcient Independence of Reactions, the path of risk aversion is identiﬁed with a linear path
(¤h,αh)(ξ) ≡ (¤hξ, kx
hk
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309F i g u r e s
risk aversion ra
dP k'  
dP  is k-sensitive 
dP  is not k-sensitive 
dP  is not k-sensitive at both equilibria 
of the economy  (e,ra) =   … 
… however  dP  is k-sensitive at both equilibria 
of the nearby economies  (e,ra) =   ,   
risk aversion ra
dP k'  
nearby  dP  k-sensitive still 
nearby  dP  k-sensitive now 
endowment e 
Along the dots  dP  is not k-sensitive.  
They arise from the one-dimensional path …   
risk aversion ra
dP k'  
endowment e 
dP  is k-sensitive at both equilibria 
of all shaded economies     save those dotted     (=generic) 
… plotted in the shade.  
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